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DRAGONS, BACON STRIPS AND DUMBBELLS-WHO'S
AFRAID OF REAPPORTIONMENT?
ROBERT J. SICKELSt
THE Supreme Court in 1964 forbade state legislatures to manipulate
the size of congressional districts to help one party or another.' But a
close look at districting from the end of World War II until the Court's
decision proves that variations in size have been of narrower signifi-
cance than is generally supposed and that other kinds of gerrymander
have had far more to do with the outcome of congressional elections. In
the great majority of states with congressional gerrymanders, unequal
district size either has not affected the gerrymander or has made it less
effective than it would have been had the districts been equal. Whatever
its other effects, then, Wesberry v. Sanders will not seriously curtail the
power of state legislative majorities to draw district lines to maximize
the election of fellow party members to Congress.
THE EFFECT OF THE GERRYMANDER ON CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Majority parties in state legislatures gerrymander congressional
districts as a matter of course. The electoral maps of many states, par-
ticularly the larger ones, are intricate jigsaw puzzles. But inspection of
electoral maps for the presence of gerrymanders is hit or miss at best.
Dragons, bacon strips, dumbbells, and other strained shapes are not
always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) inter-
ests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn
out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party.
The safest and most direct indication of gerrymandering is a state-wide
calculation of results.
A partisan gerrymander may be defined in terms of the relation of
votes cast to seats won in a state by the party responsible for drawing the
district lines. Gerrymanders can be measured and compared by holding
either factor constant. According to this definition, the party with more
seats for a given percentage of votes within the entire area encompassed
has gerrymandered with greater success. If a party wins 70 per cent of
a state's congressional representation with 60 per cent of the two-party
t Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University. B.A. 1950, MA. 1954,
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1. Wesberiy v. Sanders, 876 U.S. 1 (1964).
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vote and a party in another state wins 80 per cent with the same vote,
the latter will be said to have a more effective gerrymander. This view
of the gerrymander takes the intended and the unintended together with
out probing for specific legislative motives, although the striking effect
of state legislative control on party fortunes in congressional elections
disclosed by this measure should leave no doubt about the importance
of deliberate manipulation.
The ten congressional elections from 1946 through 1964 were an-
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Percentages of two-party vote and congressional seats won by state parties with and
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alyzed and all appropriate states were considered.2 Figure I depicts
two dimensions of partisan success in the larger states-the percentages
of votes and of seats won-arranged to contrast elections in which
parties with the majority of votes had been in a position to gerrymander
with elections in which they had not.3 The party with the power of
gerrymander is defined as the one in control of the state legislature at
the normal post-census time for redistricting, prior to the 1942, 1952,
and 1962 elections respectively and in the few additional instances in
which redistricting actually occurred at other times. The measure of
the relative effectiveness of gerrymandering appears here as a vertical
difference between the two sets of data in the diagram. In the range of
50 to 55 per cent of the popular vote where close comparisons are
available, the average pay-off in these states for parties with the power of
gerrymander is 16.9 and the median 14.5 percentage points higher on
the 0 to 100 pay-off scale than for parties whose popular majority has
been distributed among districts composed by the opposition. 4 It can
be seen that among state parties with a given level of popular vote,
those with the power of gerrymander have won a greater proportion of
seats in Congress in nearly every case.
The difference between average pay-off for gerrymandering and non-
gerrymandering parties in the states as a whole in the 50 to 55 per cent
range5 is somewhat less than in the larger states alone. Table I shows the
contrast. The difference between median pay-offs is greater when the
smaller states are included.
The deviant cases, in which the party which drew the lines won a
smaller percentage of the vote than their popular vote showed them to
2. 216 state elections of a total of 488 form the basis of this study. States with a single
seat in Congress were eliminated as not subject to a gerrymander, and those also were set
aside in which it was impossible to describe a total congressional vote for the state
(because one or more seats were uncontested) or a state legislative majority (because control
was divided between parties or the legislature was nonpartisan). States with all elections
at large were also omitted (not because they were devoid of electoral manipulation, but
because of the need they posed to build in assumptions about the comparability of data
in districted and undistricted states. Here and elsewhere it seemed better to keep the
data as free of assumptions and interpolations as possible).
One adjustment of the data was made for the few states with congressional districts
and a Congressman at large: the vote cast at large was not scored, but all seats were
included in the tabulations of party ratios of seats won and lost.
3. See AssElucA VomS (Scammon ed. 1956-59 and 1962-64); 23 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
WEEKLY REPORT 468-512 (1965); and U. S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONx Dmaaroav, 82n CoNG.,
Isr SEss. 273-79 (1951).
4. In Figure I the lines of regression will be seen to continue more or less parallel
beyond the 55 per cent point, but the number of comparative cases is insignificant.
5. Percentages of votes are rounded to the nearest whole number for Tables I and II.
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TABLE I. Percentage of Congressional Seats Won by State Parties Gaining 50 to 55 Per
Cent of the Total Congressional Vote, With and Without Responsibility for Districting
All States 10 or More Districts
Mean Median Mean Median
Party had
power of
gerrymander 69.8 (N = 69) 67.0 66.1 (N = 28) 64.0
Party did not
have power 58.0 (N = 49) 50.0 49.2 (N = 20) 49.5
Difference 11.8 17.0 16.9 14.5
deserve, shed light on the strategy of gerrymandering. Figure I shows
Missouri Republicans in 1946, who won 69 per cent of the state's seats
with 52.2 per cent of the vote, and Indiana Democrats in 1958, with
73 per cent of the seats and 53.5 per cent of the vote, to have done
abnormally well without having controlled the state legislature. In
these two states, where neither party's membership is highly concen-
trated, the gerrymander at times works so well as to leave the minority
party a single congressional seat. But the usual margin of victory is
slim and fairly evenly distributed about the state, so that when the
majority changes in one district it is likely to change in most. As Charles
Merriam wrote of the gerrymander in 1922, "The shifts in party vote
make it a dangerous practice, which sometimes recoils on the heads of
those who undertake it." '6 The party drawing congressional district
lines has a choice of maximizing its return in the long or the short run.
It may choose to capture fewer districts and maintain wider margins
in each. Because of the role of seniority in Congress, a state party's
influence is likely to depend in part on hedging against an uncertain
future in this fashion and counting consistency as an ingredient of
success in gerrymandering.
TIE RELATIVE EFFECr OF MANIPULATION OF DISTRcr SIZE
In the larger competitive states during the last two decades, the
gerrymander (including all devices active and passive, accidental and
deliberate) accounted for an average advantage of three seats to the
party favored in the state legislature. The extent to which the control
of district size has contributed to this advantage must be computed
in order to project the future of gerrymandering under the new con-
stitutional rules.
Several procedures exist for drawing district lines for maximum party
6. MTAER'., THE AMmEScAN PARTY SYsTrm 110 (1922).
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advantage. As far as possible, votes of the opposition party should be
put in districts that can be won by the gerrymandering party, taking
care to leave a margin of safety. In areas where it is clear that the op-
position party is so strong that it mdst win one or more seats, lines
should be drawn to concentrate its votes and create as large a margin of
victory as possible. It might still be practicable in such an area, as a
variation on this theme, to construct a district for one's own party by
stringing together pockets of strength. Finally, districts conceded to
the opposition could, prior to Wesberry, be made far more populous
than the rest.
The difficulty in turning these familiar rules into prescriptive formu-
las is illustrated by Hacker's 1963 study of congressional districting
which characterizes the votes in any district as "wasted," "effective," or
"excess." 7 The losing party's votes are described as wasted. The winner's
are effective to the extent needed to overcome the opposition and excess
beyond that point. According to this study, a measure of a party's success
in gerrymandering is the proportion of its state-wide total of votes that
can be classed as effective. But this satisfactory description of votes in a
single district turns out to be a troublesome beginning for state-wide
analysis. It is possible for a party holding its complement of seats
constant to increase its effectiveness score by decreasing its total vote,
and also, with a constant number of votes, to increase its "effectiveness"
by reducing the number of congressional seats won.
Consider first a party which wins by a bare majority in every district.
Its votes are 100 per cent "effective," and any additional votes lower the
score. And so in a one-party state a winning party with no opposition
scores zero in effectiveness. Second, because the formula has the effect
of weighting excess and wasted votes differently, a party can improve its
score by reducing its proportion of excess votes even in the act of losing
seats. In a three-district state the vote might be:
Party A Party B
District 1 90,000 30,000
District 2 - 120,000
District 3 20,001 20,000
Party A's effective vote is 30,001 in District 1, none in District 2, and
20,001 in District 3, or 45.4 per cent (50,002/110,001), with which it
wins two seats. But if it redistricts in the following way and obtains a
7. HAc m, CONGRESSIONAL DISMnCNG 47 (1963).
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higher score, Party A will lose a seat in Congress with the same popular
vote:
Party A Party B
District 1 60,001 60,000
District 2 50,000 70,000
Distirct 3 - 40,000
In this case Party A's effective vote is concentrated in District 1: 60,001
or 54.5 per cent. The formula gives the higher effectiveness score to the
less productive districting because Party A's excess votes have been
reduced from 59,999 in the first illustration to none in the second.
A redefinition of "effective" votes as those constituting a simple
majority in any district would improve Hacker's formula by eliminating
its bias in favor of one kind of gerrymander. But a more exact test of
the manipulation of district size is available to show the relative impact
of this and other forms of gerrymander-a test, furthermore, that unlike
the approach of Hacker, allows comparisons to be made between the
more and the less competitive states.
The measure I suggest of the size factor in gerrymandering uses
total vote rather than population as the index of district size and consists
of two operations. First, the total state vote of Party X is divided by
the total two-party vote cast for congressional candidates to arrive at
X's percentage of the state total. Second, Party X's percentages of the
vote in the districts severally are averaged, in effect eliminating the
differences in size from district to district. The disparity betveen the
results of the two calculations can be understood as the advantage
(or disadvantage) conferred by district size. For example:
Party X Party Y
District 1 60,000 (60%) 40,000 (40%)
District 2 55,000 (55%) 45,000 (45%)
District 3 25,000 (17%) 125,000 (83%)
Totals 140,000 (40%) 210,000 (60%)
Party X wins 40 percent of the total state congressional vote. The
average of its district percentages (60, 55, and 17) is 44 per cent. It
would require 44 per cent of the total vote or an additional 4 per cent
to achieve the same proportion of votes in each district if the districts
all had the same number of voters. Practically, Party X has won in the
smaller districts, Party Y in the larger district, and as a result X has the
size advantage.
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This average-percentage analysis can be used to measure the part
size plays in a gerrymander by rerunning the original tabulation
(Table I), substituting the average district vote of the party for its
actual state-wide percentage throughout. If the manipulation of size is
generally effective as a gerrymandering device, the differences between
the means (and the medians) in the second tabulation will be signifi-
cantly smaller, in a proportion that can be taken as a measure of the
TABLE II. Percentage of Congressional Seats Won by State Parties Gaining
50 to 55 Per Cent of the Average Congressional District Vote, With
and Without Responsibility for Districting
All States 10 or More Districts
Mean Median Mean Median
Party had
power of
gerrymander 69.1 (N = 69) 67.0 66.3 (N = 29) 64.0
Party did not
have power 59.8 (N = 45) 50.0 50.1 (N = 17) 50.0
Difference 9.3 17.0 16.2 14.0
Table I
difference 11.8 17.0 16.9 14.5
relative importance of this gerrymandering technique. Table II makes
it clear that control of size has not had such an impact on the congres-
sional gerrymander during the period studied.3 Table II is not signi-
TABLE III. Per Cent Advantage and Disadvantage
Attributable to District Size, 1946-1964
<-- disadvantage advantage-
0 6 8 30 90 43 22 12 5 0
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Mean -. 365 per cent
Median _ 0
N =216
ficantly different from Table I. It is reasonable to conclude that the
constitutional limitations on variation in size will not have much effect
on the drawing of district lines for the benefit of the party in control
of the state legislature.
The reason for the negative outcome is that productive and counter-
productive differences in district size nearly cancel out within and
among the states. As Table III indicates in summary form, the "ad-
8. The elections considered in Tables I and II differ marginally-a few fall between
50 and 55 percent by one formula but not by the other.
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vantage" of the average-of-percentages over the actual state-wide per-
centage of votes won by the gerrymandering party is on the whole about
nil (median 0, mean .365 per cent),9 but the range is substantial, from
minus three to plus four per cent. Dahl has furnished a rough guide to
the meaning of such margins: ". . . a net shift of 1 per cent of the
electorate from one party to the other will result in a net gain of about
2.5 per cent of the House seats for the benefited party .... "10 The
highest product moment correlation of this advantage and pay-off in
seats has a coefficient of .53, in the case of gerrymandering parties in the
50 to 55 per cent vote range among states with ten or more districts,
significant at the one per cent level. In other words, successful manipu-
lation of district size is associated with a high gerrymander score, but
most diversity in district size is not successful from the viewpoint of
the party with responsibility for districting. It is either neutral or un-
successful.
Some states have been on the minus and some on the plus side with
fair consistency during the two decades. New York and New Jersey
have had negative or counterproductive size patterns," for example,
and Maryland, Oklahoma, and South Dakota positive patterns aug-
menting their gerrymanders. One of the benefits of this measure as a
diagnostic tool is the easy comparisons it allows through time as well as
between states. Hacker's study of 1962 elections in three states--Michi-
gan, New York and California-rests on what prove by this measure
to be atypical cases. The effect of size manipulation was at a peak in
Michigan and New York, while California, offered by Hacker as an
illustration of the neglect of size manipulation, in fact scores a creditable
plus two in 1962.
The widespread practice of gerrymandering is on the whole not
dependent on control of district size. Even if the permissible variation
in district size were reduced to nothing, instead of the 30 per cent
contemplated in some proposals of members of the 89th Congress or
the 15 per cent imposed by some courts, state legislatures would be
free to adjust the party balance of their districts to increase substantially
9. There is little difference between elections occurring within ten years after re-
districting (median 0, mean .421; N = 83) and the rest (median 0, mean .330; N = 133).
In elections immediately following redistricting the average advantage is fractionally larger
(median 0, mean .695; N = 23).
10. DAnr, A PaREACE TO DE~tocRar THEORY 147 (1956), referring to the membership
of the House as a whole.
11. The extent to which these patterns are deliberate can be explored state by state.
See, e.g., THE PoLrncs oF P.IAPPORTONmNT (Jewell ed. 1962), generally and with respect
to New Jersey in particular on pp. 15 if.
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the number of seats they are likely to win. In 1965 and 1966, court-
ordered redistricting was viewed as an invitation to compensate for the
loss of one tool of gerrymandering by the sharpening of others. In
Kansas, for example, the legislature redrew district lines to reduce the
variation in size to 14 per cent, but it simultaneously increased the
margin of safety in two competitive districts to make it likely that
the gerrymandering party would win all five congressional districts with
only 54 or 55 per cent of the state-wide vote.12 It would probably be
even more difficult for the courts to fashion rules to prohibit manipula-
tion in district drawing than for it to outlaw malapportionment, but if
the effects of state legislative manipulation constitute the evil to be
prevented, the courts have no choice but to become involved in this
thorny problem.
12. 24 CONGRESIONAL QUARTERLY WVEEKLY REPORT 2048 (1966).
